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Abstract: My target article suggested that cognitive dissonance may be accounted for by a
simpler mechanism: contrast. Whether contrast can explain all cognitive dissonance effects
is an empirical question, but it is always useful to try to distinguish simpler mechanisms from
more complex cognitive ones. The insistence that cognitive dissonance is a human-only
process quite different from contrast may be a self-serving means of justifying the
exploitation of animals.
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In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher
psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which
stands lower in the psychological scale. (Morgan, 1894, p. 53)

The famous quote by Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1894) has borrowed from Occam’s razor the
idea that simpler mechanisms can often account for the results of experiments and when
they can, they are preferred. But the advantage of simpler mechanisms is not just that they
are simpler but that they may provide testable alternatives against which to further test the
more complex mechanism. That is, they can serve as a challenge to develop tests to
distinguish between the simpler and more complex explanations. Sometimes these tests
demonstrate that the simpler mechanism can adequately account for the effect, or they
provide boundary conditions for the simpler account, or they may provide evidence for the
more complex account, or they may raise new alternative accounts of the phenomenon being
studied. In any case, these tests often advance our understanding of the phenomenon.
Such is the case with the research on cognitive dissonance or the form of cognitive dissonance
called justification of effort reported in the target article (Zentall 2016). I reported the results
of several experiments in which pigeons (and humans) preferred signals for reinforcement
that followed less preferred events (greater effort, longer delays, and the absence of food)
relative to more preferred events (less effort, less delay, and food). More important, I argued
that those effects were more parsimoniously explained by contrast between the less
preferred event and the signal for reinforcement. I concluded by saying that this form of
contrast might also account for some of the findings reported as cognitive dissonance with
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humans, but that in any case this approach might better define the conditions under which a
more complex cognitive account is needed.
The term cognitive dissonance encompasses a broad range of behavior which paradoxically
appears to be inconsistent with the typical negative relation between aversive events and
preference. The research presented in the target article provided an analog for one kind of
cognitive dissonance research, justification of effort. But as noted, other kinds of cognitive
dissonance may also be relevant. For example, in the original cognitive dissonance
experiment, humans were asked to reflect back on the aversiveness of a previous task
(Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) after being paid a small or larger amount to report to a waiting
participant that the task was interesting. It was argued that there was more contrast between
the larger payment and the uninteresting task than with the small payment. Such an
experiment would be difficult to attempt with non-verbal animals.
More appropriate for the within-trial contrast effect described in the research presented in
the target article are results demonstrating that justification of effort effects depend on how
the aversive event is related to the task itself. For example, E. Harmon-Jones (2017) notes
that Gerard & Mathewson (1966) found that participants who experienced intense shocks
evaluated a group to which they thought they would gain access more positively than
participants who experienced mild shocks. But they did so only when participants were led
to believe that they were receiving the shocks in order to gain access to the group. That is,
when the shocks were viewed as independent of group initiation, no cognitive dissonance
effect was found. Although E. Harmon-Jones interpreted these results as evidence against the
contrast account, such results merely help define the conditions under which the contrast
effect will occur.
As noted by E. Harmon-Jones as well as C. Harmon-Jones et al. (2017), humans are
different from other animals in the sense that instructions can be used to override their
interpretation of the temporal occurrence of events. That is, if humans are told that two
events they have experienced — the shock and the group initiation — are not related, an
association between them is much less likely to occur. It is hard to imagine how one would
give such instructions to pigeons. Thus for pigeons it would be very difficult to disassociate
the prior effort from the value of the conditioned reinforcer that follows. For this reason,
contrary to E. Harmon-Jones’s suggestion that a contrast explanation predicts that the
association between the aversive event and reward that follows would not matter, the
association does matter for pigeons and it does matter for humans as well — unless they are
told otherwise. It would be difficult, however, to eliminate that association with nonhuman
animals because of the difficulty in telling them that the events are not related.
E. Harmon-Jones goes on to ask a related question: Why is it that contrast occurs with the
procedures we use in our studies when the relationship between effort and reward
evaluation is often quite the opposite. That is, in many cases, greater effort leads to reward
devaluation or effort discounting. For example, Botvinick et al. (2009) found that
participants showed reduced brain activity in reward centers (nucleus accumbens) when
rewards were preceded by high effort. Why do aversive events sometimes devalue the
rewards that follow (resulting in generalization) and at other times enhance those rewards
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(resulting in contrast)? I suspect that the answer lies in whether and how much the prior
effort is associated with the reward. In fact, in that experiment, participants were told that
the amount they would earn would be equal for high- and low-effort blocks, and would not
depend on their speed or accuracy. Thus, instructions to humans about the relation between
the effort and reward can determine whether there will be contrast or generalization.
As noted by E. Harmon-Jones, Festinger believed that his theory also applied to the behavior
of nonhuman animals (Lawrence & Festinger, 1962). The examples provided by Lawrence &
Festinger, however, are only remotely related to the cognitive-dissonance research that had
been conducted with humans and the justification-of-effort results we have reported with
pigeons. In fact, the results they described are easily accounted for by much simpler
behavioral mechanisms. For example, they cite the partial reinforcement extinction effect in
which, paradoxically, discriminations in which correct responses are reinforced only half of
the time are more difficult to extinguish than when correct responses are reinforced every
time. The partial reinforcement extinction effect, however, has been attributed to a
generalization decrement (extinction is more difficult to detect if training has involved a
series of non-reinforced correct responses; Capaldi, 1967) or to the response unit hypothesis
(in which the reinforced response is the sequence of responses that preceded reinforcement
during training; Mowrer & Jones, 1945).
As noted in the conclusion of the target article, although justification of effort may be based
on simpler, less cognitive contrast, it does not rule out the possibility that more complex,
cognitive dissonance effects are also involved. The purpose of the target article was to ask to
what extent contrast effects can account for results that have been attributed to conflicting
cognitions that produce dissonance. The effort to distinguish between different theories is
what allows our science to advance beyond theories that are primarily descriptive, to
theories that can better explain behavior.
The commentary of Vonk (2017) makes the reasonable argument that nonhuman animals
may engage in behaviors similar to those of humans for very different underlying reasons.
This is always a possibility, but the apparent similarity encourages researchers to explore
the conditions under which the more cognitive accounts are necessary. The effect of
instructions to dissociate the prior aversive activity from the later preference judgment
(Gerard & Mathewson, 1966) suggests one way that the effects with pigeons may be different
from those with humans.
Vonk finds it “puzzling that animals would prefer a cue that signaled the lack of food” but
the cue does not signal the absence of food. It simply follows the absence of food and that
contrast makes it preferred over a cue that follows the presence of food. Vonk also suggests
that the contrast effect described in the target article might be related to the cognitive bias
paradigm. In the cognitive bias paradigm (e.g., Burman et al. 2011), animals are trained, for
example, to associate one brightness value with food and another brightness value with the
absence of food. Then, after receiving or not receiving a reward, the animals are tested with
intermediate brightness values. Slower responses to the intermediate rewards have been
interpreted as showing a pessimistic (rather than an optimistic) bias but a more
parsimonious interpretation is that the prior feeding affected the animals’ motivation. In this
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case, the animals showed a longer latency to the middle-valued brightness after having been
fed. Distinguishing motivational effects from affective (optimism versus pessimism) effects
presents an important challenge to researchers interested in the cognitive bias paradigm.
Also mentioned in the target article was the choice-induced preference effect (or the
spreading-of-alternatives effect) in which, given a choice between two alternatives, the one
that was not selected appears to acquire aversive properties relative to a novel alternative.
This effect has been viewed as an example of cognitive dissonance but it is not directly
related to justification of effort effect and so probably should not have been included in the
target article. Chen and Risen (2010) viewed the choice-induced preference effect as an
artifact of “revealed preferences” among the three alternatives. They argued that just by
chance, natural preferences would produce such a bias; however, as is noted by E. HarmonJones as well as by C. Harmon-Jones et al. and Eisenreich & Hayden (2017), but neglected
in the target article, evidence against the revealed preferences hypothesis was provided by
research showing that choice-induced preference could be found even when subjects did not
actually choose between the first two alternatives. What still needs to be ruled out, however,
is the possibility that preference for the third alternative over the unchosen alternative
results from a preference for novelty over familiarity because the non-selected alternative
was familiar and the new (third alternative) was novel. In any event, the choice-induced
preference may be unrelated to the justification of effort, and its discussion would have been
more appropriately reserved for a different time.
Finally, C. Harmon-Jones et al. propose that the motivation to “humanize” humans and
“dehumanize” nonhuman animals itself may be relevant to dissonance theory: The insistence
that cognitive dissonance is a human-only process quite different from contrast may be a
self-serving means of justifying the exploitation of animals. This clever twist on several of
the commentaries shifts the focus from the research on cognitive dissonance to the
motivation of the cognitive dissonance researcher who may have a vested interest in the
distinction between humans and other animals.
The intent of the target article was to suggest that the basis of cognitive dissonance may be
a form of contrast, a simpler mechanism. Whether contrast can account for all cognitive
dissonance effects that have been reported is an empirical question. More broadly, the search
for tests to distinguish simpler from more cognitive mechanisms has value not only in
establishing the underlying basis for the phenomena in question but also in helping to better
define and understand the causes of behavior.
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